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The Unique Challenge of Dual-Purpose
Organizations: Comparative Analysis of U.S.
and Israel Approaches to Combating the
Finance of Terrorism
AVIV (COHEN) DEKEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Exploring the legal aspects of counter terrorism has for a long time
now been the “new world” of scholarly writings. Much like the first
expeditious ships of the fifteenth century, brave legal minds sailed away
to this unknown legal turf more than a decade ago, paving the way for
voluminous writing. Today, the legal writing dealing with counter
terrorism is broad and diverse, covering international law, domestic law,
criminal law, humanitarian law, and others legal fields. Of particular
focus for many years in this legal discourse stands the issue of financing
terrorism. This is due to the centrality attributed to financing in the
initial stages of orchestrating a terrorist act, and its negative effects on
the world economy.1
As terrorists grow more sophisticated,2 the legal instruments
required to counter them should exhibit at least the same level of
cleverness. On the international level, various legal tools exist to
counter different aspects of terrorism, from regional conventions and
international conventions to Security Council Resolution. Of these
* LL.M. Georgetown University Law Center, LL.M. Hebrew University of Jerusalem, LL.B.
Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Prof. David Stewart and Prof. Albert Rees of Georgetown
University Law Center read the earlier drafts of this article and shared their insightful comments
and thoughts on the issues it raises. Any mistakes in this final version are those of the author
alone.
1. For further reading on the economic ramifications of terrorism financing, see R. Barry
Johnston & Oana M. Nedelescu, The Impact of Terrorism on Financial Markets, 13(1) J. OF
FINANCIAL CRIME 7 (2006).
2. An interesting argument to the contrary was put forward by Professor Gal and Professor
Taylor, who claim that terrorist acts themselves are not relatively expensive to execute, and so the
current trend is privatization of terrorist financing. This means that terrorist organizations rely
mostly on self-financing and not as much on external sources. See Istvan Laszlo Gal & James
Park Taylor, Financing Terrorism: Afghanistan and the Haqqani, 28 (10) INT’L ENFORCEMENT
L. REP. 346 (2012). While this argument may stand on solid data, it is also quite narrow in its
scope of examination. Financing terrorism as a concept includes more than mere expenses of
detonations, purchase of knowledge and other technical aspects. It also encompasses the money
invested in recruiting members, propaganda, payment to suicide terrorists’ families and so forth.
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instruments, two are especially important in the context of counter
financing of terrorism. These are the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,3 which requires member
states to create a domestic criminal offense of financing of terrorism;
and Security Council Resolution 1373, which reinforced that
requirement and enhanced it by calling on states to take further
measures, such as freezing assets related to terrorist acts and so forth.4
On the domestic front, anti-terrorism financing legislation reached
its most extensive scope yet. In fact, some statutes are so broad, that
they sacrificed their ability to pay attention to nuances and special
circumstances in the name of overreaching application. This article
focuses on one such nuance, the phenomenon of dual-purpose
organizations—organizations that marry together terrorist and nonterrorist activities, and compares the application of two anti-terrorism
statutes to such cases. The two statutes analyzed here are those of the
United States and of Israel, two nations that are no strangers to terrorist
attacks and which have well developed anti-terrorism legal schemes.
Surprisingly enough, this issue has generated almost no scholarly
writing, leaving a corner of the once “new legal world” still untouched.
Most of the legal discourse to date deals with international and domestic
regulation and the instruments used to counter the financing of
terrorism,5 or with the issue of terrorist organizations exploiting the
vulnerabilities of charities and non-profit organizations in order to
receive funding.6 The importance of these issues notwithstanding, they
3. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9,
1999, 2178 U.N.T.S. 197.
4. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 1(c), U.N. DOC. S/RES/1325 (Sept. 28, 2001).
5. See Navin Beekarry, The International Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the
Financing of Terrorism Regulatory Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Compliance Determinants in
International Law, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 137 (2011), for a comprehensive analysis of the
Financial Task Force’s activity in the fight against financing of terrorism. See also Alison
Elizabeth Chase, Legal Mechanisms of the International Community and the United States
Concerning State Sponsorship of Terrorism, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 41 (2004), for an interesting
comparison between United States law and international law with regard to state responsibility
for acts of terrorism; see also Laura K. Donohue, Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom
and United States, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 303 (2006) for background on the legislation and policy
for countering the financing of terrorism.
6. See Jennifer Lyn Bell, Terrorist Abuse of Non-Profit and Charities: A Proactive
Approach to Preventing Terrorist Financing, 17 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 450 (2008), where she
lists the reasons why charities and non-profit organizations are especially vulnerable to abuse for
the financing of terrorism; Nina J. Crimm, High Alert: The Government’s War on the Financing
of Terrorism and its Implications for Donors, Domestic Charitable Organizations, and Global
Philanthropy, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1341 (2004). For insights on this topic with respect to
Canadian law, see David G. Duff, Charities and Terrorist Financing, 61 UNIV. OF TORONTO L. J.
73 (2011). An especially instructive presentation on the work of charities in the Arab world is
found in Mona Atia’s piece on Egypt, where it is argued that “[b]ecause of [the] harsh
environment [in Egypt], there is no need for anti-terrorism legislation to prevent anti-terrorism
financing through Islamic charities. While in the international context, including in many Middle
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lack a direct confrontation with the question: has anti-terrorism
financing gone too far so as to preclude any funding for social or
humanitarian projects solely because they are affiliated with a terrorist
organization?
Unfortunately, as the argument presented here demonstrates, the
answer to this question is no. In fact, domestic legislation, at least in the
United States and Israel, has not gone far enough in preventing dualpurpose organizations from abusing their non-terrorist fraction for
purposes of financing terrorism. Dual-purpose organizations do perform
important social functions, and sometimes they do so in a political
vacuum, which means that no other governmental entity will take upon
itself to provide such services. However, in most cases, the main focus
of dual-purpose organizations are to serve violent terrorist campaigns,
and so long as it stays that way, regretfully, it is the innocent
beneficiaries of the aforementioned welfare projects that will suffer the
consequences.
The paper consists of five parts. Following this introduction, Part 2
provides a comparative overview of anti-terrorism financing legislation
in the United States and Israel. It focuses on the criminal offense of
supporting terrorist organizations, which in both cases, includes
providing currency, and examines the elements of both offenses. Part 3
introduces the concept of dual-purpose organizations and the dilemmas
they pose. To further crystallize the question at hand, Part 3 puts a
spotlight on one project, the Islamist University of Gaza (“Islamist
University” or “the University”), the most advanced educational
institution available to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, which at the same
time operates under the auspices of Hamas, an organization widely
recognized as a terrorist organization. Part 4 merges the previous two
sections together, confronting the question of whether funding a new
library at the University will be considered an offense of supporting
terrorism under the two aforementioned statutes. Part 5 concludes the
discussion, and suggests some lessons learned from the example
presented earlier on.
II. COMBATING FINANCING OF TERRORISM: COMPARATIVE
PRESENTATION OF UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL LEGISLATION
In order to evaluate the ability of anti-terrorism legislation to
address dual-purpose organizations, this Part presents and analyzes the
Eastern countries, the global war on terror profoundly affected charities on the ground, its impact
has been much less direct on Islamic charities in Egypt”; see Mona Atia, Innocent Victims: An
Accounting of Anti-Terrorism in the Egyptian Legal Context, 9 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L.
1, 18 (2009−2010).
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financing of terrorism offense in the United States and Israel. The
language of the financing offense in both cases is quite similar in its
scope of the actus reus it criminalizes and the definition of a terrorist
organization as the beneficiary of that action, but they differ greatly
with respect to the mens rea requirement, as will be illustrated ahead.
A. United States
The United States’ efforts to combat terrorism manifests itself in
many forms. The legal discourse offers extensive surveys of these
efforts,7 including vast amounts of writing criticizing those measures.8
With no intention to reiterate those discussions, this part focuses on one
piece of this complex puzzle, the Providing Material Support or
Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations Act, or 18
U.S.C. § 2339B.9 This provision warrants special attention in the
context of combating the financing of terrorism because it is this section
of the United States criminal code that makes financing foreign terrorist
organizations a criminal offense.
Section 2339B(a)(1) makes it an offense to knowingly provide
material in support of or resources to a foreign terrorist organization,
and makes it an offense punished by a fine and/or imprisonment. This
section has been the star of much case law in United States courts; and
7. For a survey of U.S. anti-terrorism provisions, see Michael W. Ryan, Not All Practice
Makes Perfect: How the Treasury’s Revised Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines Still Fail to
Adequately Address Charitable Concerns, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 739, 741−47 (2008). See
also James P. McLoughlin, Jr., Deconstructing United States Sentencing Guidelines Section
3A1.4: Sentencing Failure in Cases of Financial Support for Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 28
L. & INEQUALITY 58, 68−71 (2010) (discussing the correlation between anti-terrorism statutes
and the penalties prescribed to them).
8. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 6, at 452, 463 (arguing that the U.S. government ought to take
a more rigorous role in monitoring the use of non-profit organizations to finance terrorism and
that current initiatives do not safeguard the non-profit sector from terrorist abuse); Kent Roach,
The Air India Report and the Regulation of Charities and Terrorism Financing, 61 UNIV. OF
TORONTO L. J. 45, 50 (2011) (claiming that current terrorism financing regime are not only
ineffective, but also their direct and indirect costs far exceed their benefits); Ryan, supra note 7,
at 751−58 (criticizing the U.S. Treasury’s guidelines regarding charities); Crimm, supra note 6, at
1353 (criticizing the anti-terrorism legislation in the U.S. as having devastating effects on
charities). On the contrary, there are also those who support this policy, such as Barkin, who
argued that even buying air time for commercials on certain Arab radio stations by American
corporations ought to be considered material support to terrorism. See Angela A. Barkin,
Corporate America – Making a Killing: An Analysis of Why it is Appropriate to Hold American
Corporations Who Fund Terrorist Organizations Liable for Aiding and Abetting Terrorism, 40
CAL. W. L. REV. 169, 188–89 (2003).
9. For further reading on § 2339B, see David Henrik Pendle, Charity of the Heart and
Sword: The Material Support Offense and Personal Guilt, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 777, 783−86
(2007); Stefanie Dresdner Lincoln, Drawing the Line: Buckley’s Impact on the Intersection of
Contributions and the First Amendment, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 445 (2009); Brian P.
Comerford, Preventing Terrorism by Prosecuting Material Support, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
723 (2005).
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its constitutionality has been challenged dozens of times,10 most notably
in the prolonged litigation of the Humanitarian Law Project case,11
where the plaintiffs claimed it violated both the First and Fifth
Amendments of the Constitution. As in many cases before, § 2339B
dodged the constitutional bullet when the Supreme Court limited its
analysis to the application of § 2339B to the present case’s
circumstances, but did not address the principal question of whether this
statute would be constitutional or not in more difficult cases.12
These concerns notwithstanding, in comparison to having softer
legislation, let alone no legislation at all, § 2339B offers few
advantages. At least one commentator noted that the strength and
centrality of § 2339B in the American fight against terrorism is that it
enables the U.S. legal system to prevent terrorist acts ex ante and not
10. Charles Doyle, Senior Specialist in American Public Law, surveys a handful of such
cases. See United States v. Taleb-Jedi, 566 F.Supp.2d 157, 181–82 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also
United States v. Warsame, 537 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1018 (D. Minn. 2008); see also United States v.
Shah, 474 F.Supp.2d 492, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also United States v. Marzook, 383
F.Supp.2d 1056, 1066 (N.D. Ill. 2005); see also United States v. Assi, 414 F.Supp.2d 707, 718
(E.D. Mich. 2006); see also United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 331 (4th Cir. 2004); see
CHARLES DOYLE, TERRORIST MATERIAL SUPPORT: AN OVERVIEW OF 18 U.S.C. 2339A AND
2339B, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41333 (2010).
11. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). The plaintiffs in this
litigation were two U.S. citizens, five nonprofit groups supporting the terrorist group LTTE, and
the Humanitarian Law Project, a human rights organization with consultative status to the United
Nations. Id. at 2713–14. In 1998, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Section
2339B when they argued it prohibited them from supporting the LTTE and the PKK, both
designated foreign terrorist organizations, through providing money, tangible aid, legal training,
and political advocacy. Id. at 2714. The grounds for the statute’s unconstitutionality were
twofold: first, the statute’s language was too vague so as to render it unconstitutional. Id. Second,
the statute arguably violated the plaintiffs’ rights of freedom of speech and freedom of
association, because “it prohibited their provision of material support without requiring the
Government to prove that plaintiffs had a specific intent to further the unlawful ends of those
organizations.” Id. This litigation went on for twelve long years, during which the case moved
back and forth different instances, and was complicated further by Congress amending the statute
twice during that time. The verdict drew much attention and subsequently much scholarly
writing. For further reading on this topic, see Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material
Support, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of Speech, 63 HASTINGS L. J. 455, 480 (2012). Margulies
defends the Court’s decision, claiming that the Court “fashioned a hybrid approach that blended
intermediate and heightened scrutiny with the avoidance canon.” See also Adam Tomkins,
Criminalizing Support for Terrorism: A Comparative Perspective, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 81 (2010), examining the issues arising from the verdict viś-a-viś United Kingdom and
European Union Law; Pendle supra note 9, at 786–93; John Cerone, Caveat Doctor:
International Law and the Criminalization of Teaching It, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 487,
488 (2011) (arguing that the Court’s ruling is inconsistent with legal obligations of the United
States under International Law).
12. This characterizes the approach the United States’ courts took for the most part with
respect to the constitutional difficulties that arise from anti-terrorism legislation. Without making
general assertions on whether the relevant statute is constitutional in whole, and not merely as
applied, the courts will usually rely on common notions rather than legal arguments, such as “the
law is established that there is no constitutional right to fund terrorism”. See Holy Land
Foundation for Relief v. John D. Ashcroft et al., 333 F.3d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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settle for only responding to them ex post.13 Additionally, the same
broad language that is heavily criticized allows United States law
enforcement authorities to prosecute many forms of terrorist support
acts, thereby demonstrating a more constructive approach to combating
terrorism.14 If a terrorist cannot execute his plans without a wide net of
support, then criminalizing those supporters might prevent the terrorist
act from happening.15
This offense constitutes three terms which require further
clarification. First, the actus reus of the offense—providing material
support or resources.16 Section 2339B(g)(4) defines “material support or
resources” by referencing the definition of that term in the neighboring
clause, § 2339A.17 Section 2339A is the Providing Material Support to
Terrorists Act, which in contrast to § 2339B, focuses on terrorist acts
rather than terrorist organizations. Section 2339A(b)(1) defines
“material support or resources” to include:
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency
or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services,
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false
documentation or identification, communications equipment,
facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (one or
more individuals who may be or include oneself), and
transportation, except medicine or religious materials.18

This definition is by all accounts a broad one and encompasses
many forms of support.19 With due regard to the concerns that such
13. Comerford, supra note 9, at 725−26.
14. In Professor Chesney’s article he refers to this advantage as performing two important
but distinct functions: the “unfocused preventive function” and the “focused preventive function.”
The former refers to inhibiting the flow of support thus limiting the ability of terrorists to execute
their plans, and the latter refers to the labeling of supporters of terrorism as personally dangerous.
See Robert Chesney, The Supreme Court, Material Support, and the Lasting Impact of Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 1 WAKE FOREST L. REV. F. 13, 14 (2010).
15. This is similar to a discussion from the laws of war paradigm, regarding civilians who
are direct participants in hostilities. Under this premise, in certain circumstances, civilians lose
their “civilian immunity” and even though they are not part of the armed forces of a party to a
conflict, they may be lawfully targeted. The conditions that render a civilian as directly
participating in the hostilities, or DPH, may vary, but they may include people who provide
support such as drivers or cooks. Thus, as in the material support statute, the underlying
assumption is that the commission of a wrongful act requires greater involvement than the one
pushing the button. The entire support system of the executor must also be viewed as wrong
doers, because to some degree they enabled the wrongful act to take place. For further reading on
the subject, see Asa Kasher & Amos Yadlin, Assassination and Preventive Killing, 24 SAIS REV.
41 (2005).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2009).
17. Id.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2009).
19. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 743, arguing in the name of charity organization, that this
“sweeping definition includes virtually any type of aid that a charity conceivably grant.” See also

10/16/2013 10:58 AM

2013]

The Unique Challenge of Dual Purpose Organizations

395

language might cause, this article focuses on financial support, probably
the least controversial form of support; therefore, these concerns do not
arise in the current context.
The second concept in the material support offense that generated
heated discussion is the term “foreign terrorist organization,” or FTO.
“FTOs are organizations that were designated as such by the Secretary
of State in accordance with Section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.”20 Under this provision, three criteria must be met in
order to make such a designation: 1) the entity must be a foreign
organization; 2) that foreign organization must engage in terrorist
activity or have the means and intent to do so; and 3) the terrorist
activity must pose a threat to the national security of the United States
or its nationals.21 The current list of designated FTOs, as published by
the Department of State, includes fifty-one organizations.22
Lastly, the third element of the offense is the mens rea, the
knowledge requirement.23 To violate § 2339B, a person must have
knowledge that the organization he or she provided material support to
was a designated FTO and that it engaged in terrorist activity.24 It is
interesting to note that the mens rea requirement in § 2339B is much
broader than the one in §2339A. Section 2339B only requires
knowledge that the organization is a designated FTO or that the
organization engaged or engages in terrorist activity, whereas § 2339A
Alexander J. Urbelis, Rethinking Extraterritorial Prosecution in the War on Terror: Examining
the Unintentional Yet Foreseeable Consequences of Extraterritorially Criminalizing the
Provisions of Material Support to Terrorists and Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 22 CONN. J.
INT’L L. 313, 332 (2007), asserting that “material support should not be defined so broadly as to
encompass even mere acts of lodging terrorists.” Professor Cerone also argued that it is a statute
of “extraordinary breadth of scope, both in terms of the range of conduct it captures as well as its
jurisdictional sweep.” See Cerone, supra note 11, at 487. Another interesting criticism is made by
Lombardo, Buwalda and Lyman, who argue that this definition is overly broad so as to render
victims of totalitarian regimes, who seek refuge in the United States as terrorists or “material
support[ers],” thus denying them their legitimate right of asylum. See Michele L. Lombardo et al.,
Terrorism, M.aterial Support, The Inherent Right to Self Defense, and the United States
Obligation to Protect Legitimate Asylum Seekers in a Post-9/11, Post-PATRIOT Act, Post-Real
ID Act World, 4 REGENT J. INT’L L. 237, 237 (2006).
20. Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Org., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
21. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 12 (2006).
22. Bureau of Counterterrorism, supra note 20. The listing process is heavily criticized in
the legal literature. For example, see Roach, supra note 8, at 51, arguing that listing has always
constituted a problematic exercise because it fuses judicial, executive, and legislative powers in
proclaiming a person to be an international outlaw without advance notice or a hearing and often
on the basis of secret intelligence that is never publicly disclosed. See also Donohue, supra note
5, at 425−28. The listing process in the United States is similar to the process in the United
Nations under Security Council Resolution 1267. For further reading on this subject, see Craig
Forcese and Kent Roach, Limping Into the Future: The United Nations 1267 Terrorism Listing
Process at the Crossroads, 42 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 217, 258 (2010).
23. Ryan, supra note 7, at 743.
24. Id.
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requires that the defendant have specific intent to further illegal
activities.25 One possible explanation is that § 2339B was intended to
prevent terrorist organizations from deceivingly raising funds under the
pretense of humanitarian aid.26 Another is that § 2339B was designed to
close a loophole in § 2339A which enabled donors to charity
organizations to escape the application of the material support clause.27
Thus, the financing offense under United States law is satisfied
with a very low mens rea requirement, therefore covering a wide range
of activities and allowing the possibility to charge almost every activity
associated with dual-purpose organization as an offense. The
hypothetical scenario described in Part 3 demonstrates this point. As the
next sections delve into the Israeli parallel of § 2339B, it is worth noting
the major difference between these two statutes—the mens rea
requirement and how that might come into play in the context of dualpurpose organizations.
B. Israel
The leading statute in Israel governing the field of financing
terrorism is the Prohibition on Terrorist Financing Law (“the Law”).28
The basic notion underlying the Law is that the financing of a terrorist
organization, despite it being an action from the private-business sphere,
poses a real threat to the security of the Israeli public.29
Article 1 of the Law defines “Terrorist Organization” as an
association of people, which acts to perpetrate an act of terrorism or has
as its goal, enabling or promoting the perpetration of an act of
terrorism.30 The definition also states that it is immaterial “1) whether or
25. Id. at 743−44. This requirement was subject to much criticism, including calls for
requiring proof of specific intent rather than the general knowledge currently required, Jonathan
D. Stewart, Balancing the Scales of Due Process: Material Support of Terrorism and the Fifth
Amendment, 3 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 313 (2005). One commentator even went as far as
suggesting to amend §2339B so as to require a mens rea of recklessness, see Pendle, supra note
9, at 778.
26. Ryan, supra note 7, at 744.
27. McLoughlin, supra note 7, at 65.
28. Prohibition on Terrorist Financing Law, 5765-2003, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (ISR.),
http://www.justice.gov.il/MOJEng/Halbanat+Hon/TerrorFinancingNew.htm (last visited July 25,
2013).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2−3. “Act of Terrorism” is defined in Article 1 of the Law as:
an act that constitutes an offence or a threat to commit an act that constitutes
an offence that was committed or was planned to be committed in order to
influence a matter of policy, ideology or religion if all of the following
conditions are fulfilled: it was committed or was planned to be committed with
the goal of causing fear or panic among the public or with the goal of coercing
a government or another governing authority, including the government or
governing authority of a foreign country to take action or to refrain from taking
action; for the purposes of this paragraph – foreseeing, as a nearly certain
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not the members of the organization know the identity of the other
members; 2) if the composition of the members of the organization is
fixed or changes; [or] 3) if the organization also carries out legal
activities and if it also acts for legal purposes.”31
Article 8(a) of the Law prohibits a “transaction in property for the
purposes of terrorism.”32 It reads as follows:
33

34

One who performs a transaction in property for the purpose
of enabling, furthering or financing the perpetration of an act of
terrorism, or to reward the perpetration of an act of terrorism, or for
the purpose of enabling, furthering or financing the activity of a
declared terrorist organization or of a terrorist organization shall be
liable to imprisonment for ten years or a fine that is twenty times
greater than the fine set in Article 61(a)(4) of the Penal Law.35

Article 8(b) gives three clarifications with respect to paragraph
(a).36 First, Article 8(b)(1) deals with the standard of proof that is
required, and says that “proof that a transaction was performed for one
of the purposes set forth in [paragraph (a)] is sufficient, even if it was
possibility, that the act or the threat will cause fear or panic among the public
is equivalent to having a goal to cause fear or panic among the public; the act
that was committed or that was planned or the threat included: actual injury to
a person’s body or his freedom, or placing a person in danger of death or
danger of grievous bodily injury; the creation of actual danger to the health or
security of the public; serious damage to property; serious disruption of vital
infrastructures, systems or services; if the aforementioned act or threat was
committed or was planned to be committed using weapons as defined in
Section 144(c)(1) and (3) of the Penal Law, excluding a weapon part or
accessory, it will be considered an act of terrorism even if the conditions of
paragraph (1) of subsection (a) are not met, and if it was committed or planned
to be committed using chemical, biological or radioactive weapons that are
liable, due to their nature, to cause actual mass harm – even if the conditions
set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) are not met.
31. Id. at 1.
32. Id. at 9.
33. Id. at 3. “Property transaction” is defined in Article 1 of the Law as:
acquisition or receipt of ownership or other rights in property, regardless of
whether any consideration is paid, including solicitation, transfer, receipt,
possession, exchange, banking transactions, investment, any transaction
involving securities or possession of securities, brokerage, granting or receipt
of credit, import, export or creation of a trust or co-mingling of terrorist
property with other property even if it is not terrorist property.
34. Prohibition on Terrorist Financing Law, 5765-2004, 9 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE (ISR.),
http://www.justice.gov.il/MOJEng/Halbanat+Hon/TerrorFinancingNew.htm (last visited July 25,
2013). “Property” is defined in Article 1 of the Law as: “immovable and movable property,
monies and rights, inclusive of property which is the proceeds of any such property, and any
property accruing or originating from such property or its profit.”
35. Id. at 10.
36. Id.
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not proven for which of these purposes specifically.”37 Second, Article
8(b)(2) defines the term “for the purpose” to include “foreseeing that at
least one of the possibilities set forth [in paragraph (a)] is a nearly
certain possibility.”38 And third, Article 8(b)(3) broadens the meaning
of “to reward the perpetration of an act of terrorism” by establishing
that it applies “even if the recipient of the reward is not the one who
perpetrated or planned to perpetrate the act of terrorism.”39 In plain
language, in order to be charged with the crime of financing terrorism in
Israel, the defendant needed to have performed a transaction in property,
with a purpose that this transaction will in some form contribute to
terrorist activity or of a terrorist organization, even if the direct
beneficiary is not the terrorist itself.40
Compared to § 2339B, Article 8(a) seems to be narrower in the
scope of the criminalized conducts, since on its face, it only covers a
“transaction in property,”41 while § 2339B deals with a long list of acts
that constitute “material support.”42 Even though a closer look at the
Law as a whole reveals that the definitions of “transaction” and
“property” are quite broad, it is still narrower.43 Because the Law is
designed to deal specifically with the financing of terrorism, Article 8
does not cover conducts such as “training, expert advice or assistance,
safehouses, false documentation or identification,” like § 2339A does.44
In both statutes, the beneficiary of the act is a terrorist
organization.45 In § 2339B, it is a foreign organization, rendering the
clause an extraterritorial application.46 In the Israeli Law, there is no
restriction on the geographical scope: neither the definition of a terrorist
organization nor the definition of an act of terrorism addresses its
geographical location.47 Thus, it could also apply extraterritorially.
The primary difference between these two statutes is the mens rea
requirement. Whereas § 2339B places the threshold at knowledge that
the recipient is a designated FTO,48 Article 8(a) sets the bar higher by
requiring a nexus between the act of the defendant and an act of
terrorism.49 The purpose of the defendant’s act, according to the Israeli
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 9−10.
Id. at 10.
Prohibition on Terrorist Financing Law, 5765-2004, supra note 34, at 10.
Id. at 9.
18 U.S.C. § 2339(b)(1) (2009).
Prohibition on Terrorist Financing Law, 5765-2003, supra note 28, at 9.
18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2009).
Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009).
Id.
Prohibition on Terrorist Financing Law, 5765-2003, supra note 28, at 1.
18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009).
Prohibition on Terrorist Financing Law, 5765-2003, supra note 28, at 1.
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Law, must be an effort to contribute to the terrorist act before its
commission or to reward the terrorist act after its commission.50 Israeli
Law also prescribes the general financing of a terrorist organization,51
but in this context, it is an end in itself, not a conduct, and so distinct
from the conduct of knowingly financing a designated FTO as described
in § 2339B.52
While the Israeli Law does not require that the origin of the
property be a terrorist activity, the Israel Supreme Court held that if the
property in question was itself a product of terrorist activity, it might
suggest its purpose was to further terrorism.53 This flexes the mens rea
requirement because it enables proof of knowledge of the origin of the
property to imply knowledge about the future use of that property.
With this analysis in mind, the next Part turns to presenting the
phenomenon of dual-purpose organizations, their characteristics and the
challenges they pose. In order to better convey the moral and policy
dilemmas such organizations carry, the next part will also examine an
example of such duality that will be later examined through the lens of
the two statutes presented in this part.
III. DUAL-PURPOSE ORGANIZATIONS
Dual-purpose organizations include at least two distinct wings that
differ in their objectives and their actions to achieve those objectives,
not all of which are necessarily criminal or violent.54 Although this
concept is not new,55 it is not widely recognized. The definition of just
how much social non-terrorist activity renders an organization a dualpurpose one is complex. An extreme approach is demonstrated by
Professor Levanon who argues, “only an organization the entire
concerted action of which is directed toward committing terrorist
50. Id. at 9.
51. Id.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2009).
53. Crim.A. 6378/10 Isaweey v. State of Israel, [2010] not published, 12−13. In that case,
the appellant’s Arab-Israeli lawyer, was accused of financing terrorism because she transferred
funds from bank accounts of Hamas in the Gaza Strip to bank accounts of security detainees in
Israeli prisons. The appellate claimed to not know what the purpose of the funds. Nonetheless, the
Court held that the appellant’s knowledge of the origin of the funds from bank accounts of Hamas
meant that she knew the funds were proceeds of terrorist activity. Thus she could have foreseen
with almost complete certainty that these fund would sponsor future terrorist activities.
54. Liat Levanon, Criminal Prohibitions on Membership in Terrorist Organizations, 15
NEW CRIM. L. R. 224, 228 (2012).
55. See for example, Pendle, supra note 9, at 781, arguing already in 2007 that “some
foreign terrorist organizations are categorized as ‘dual method’ organizations because they
engage in both violent methods and legitimate political or humanitarian efforts,” and that because
of this characterization, members of such organizations could “conceivably support only peaceful
projects and need not necessarily endorse their organization’s use of violence.” In a more recent
writing, the concept of dual-purpose organizations stood as a central element in Levanon, supra
note 54.
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attacks should be defined as a terrorist organization.”56 Thus, any
organization that performs activities other than terrorist ones falls
outside this high threshold and is by default a dual-purpose
organization.
Even if a terrorist organization engages in social or business
activities to a large extent, it is questionable whether these activities are
as a matter of fact, distinct from its violent activity. The Israeli High
Court of Justice contended that “it is impossible to genuinely
distinguish between the social function of a terrorist organization from
its violent function, and any such distinction is inherently wrong.”57
When a contribution is made to the social, non-violent fraction of the
terrorist organization, it is difficult to guarantee the final destination of
the money.58
Among the voices of opposition to the concept of dual-purpose
organizations is the Supreme Court of the United States which recently
held, with respect to al-Qaeda lodging facilities, that al-Qaeda should be
viewed as a single terrorist organization with no non-military wing.59
The Israel Supreme Court has also recognized that:
terrorist organizations spend many resources in advocacy and public
relations, as in non-terrorist activity such as social and humanitarian
activities, to expand their basis of support as widely as possible
within the general population and to foster new recruits from that
population. These activities are conditioned upon a strong financial
60
foundation and a large use of financial systems to enable them.

On the one hand, social institutions operating under the auspices
and guidance of a terrorist organization can be used as a platform for
terrorist purposes such as recruiting and propaganda.61 In fact, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has
listed terrorism financing schemes using charities to raise or transfer
funds to support terrorist organizations as one of the most commonly

56. Isaweey v. State of Israel, supra note 53, at 229, but even Levanon admits that in the
realm of financing of terrorism specific difficulties arise and the distinction between different
branches of one organization is somewhat blurred. Id. at 254.
57. HCJ 1169/09 Legal Forum for the Land of Israel v. Prime Minister [2009] (Isr.). This
case revolved around a petition to prohibit the execution of Israeli Government decision allowing
the transfer of 175 million NIS (roughly 700 million USD) from banks in the West Bank to the
Gaza Strip through Israel, funds that were designated as salaries of 78,000 employees of the
Palestinian Authority that resides in the Gaza Strip. The Petitioners argued that such a transaction
constitutes financing of terrorism.
58. Bell, supra note 6, at 456−57.
59. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 9, Awad Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866
(2011) (No. 10-1383).
60. Crim.A. 3872/06 Ploni v. State of Israel [2007], not published, ¶ 9.
61. Margulies, supra note 11, at 484.
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detected method involving the abuse of charities.62
On the other hand, many terrorist organizations operate in places
that lack an organized central government that takes care of the social
needs of the local population.63 Sometimes, it is the organization itself
that functions as the de facto government in a defined territory, as the
population depends on it for welfare and social services.64 Thus,
building schools, water and sewage systems, establishing clinics and
youth centers—acts that must be conducted, or at least approved by the
local municipality—will go through the public officials of the governing
organization.65 This last argument carries a lot of weight. In the
previously mentioned Al-Bihani case,66 the Supreme Court of the United
States declared that al-Qaeda does not have a “non-military” wing, but
it did so through identifying al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization, as
opposed to a sovereign state.67 One consequence of refusing to
recognize the unique form of dual-purpose organizations is that private
individuals that do business with the non-violent wing of such
organization will have zero incentive to make further contributions. For
one thing, they themselves may be subject to designation as Specially
Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) by the Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC).68 The best way to understand how dual-purpose
organizations operate is by closely looking into one, as further explored
in the next section.

62. OECD Report on Abuse of Charities for Money Laundering and Tax Evasion, OECD
11–12 (2009), http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchangeofinformation/42232037.pdf [hereinafter OECD
Report].
63. Margulies, supra note 11, at 484.
64. Pendle, supra note 9, at 782.
65. Id.
66. See Awad Al-Bihani v. Obama, supra note 59.
67. Id. at 5. On page 9 of the decision, the Court holds that “Unlike a sovereign nation with
a civilian population, al-Qaeda is a terrorist organization engaged in an armed conflict with the
United States, and it has no “non-military” wing. Id. at 9.
68. Similar to the sanctions imposed on legal persons, a designation as a SDGT enables the
blocking of all the SDGT’s property and interests in property subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States. This was the case of Yassin Abdullah Kadi, whose financial support of terrorist
activities through a charitable organization known as Muwafaq Foundation was one of the main
reasons of his designation as SDGT. Kadi, a Saudi citizen, challenged his designation in United
States court, but was denied. The Court acknowledged the fact that the Muwafaq Foundation was
a charitable organization or performed charitable deeds, but held nonetheless that his fact “does
not make it immune to designation by OFAC’, thus, implementing the view which does not
differentiate between branches of a terrorist organization, as will be elaborated ahead in Part 3.
See Kadi v. Timothy Geithner, No.1:09-cv-00108-JDB, WL 898778, at *22 (D.D.C. Mar. 19,
2012). Another example is the case of the Holy Land Foundation, in which the Court noted that
“OFAC needed only to determine that Hamas had an interest in [the Foundation’s] property” in
order to apply financial sanctions on the Foundation. See Holy Land Foundation, supra note 12,
at 6−7.
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Case Study: Hamas and the Islamic University in Gaza
Hamas, “Islamic Resistance Movement,” is a Palestinian Sunni
fundamentalist Islamic movement, whose goal is to establish an Islamic
Palestinian state in the land of Israel.69 It was established in 1987 by
members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip.70 Currently,
Hamas exhibits three main branches: the first is a political branch that
has governed the Gaza strip since 2006;71 second, a military branch
known as the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, which runs an ongoing
terrorist campaign against Israel through terrorist acts;72 and the third, a
civilian-social branch known as the “Dawaa,” which is responsible for
promoting the welfare of the population in Gaza, by doing things such
as opening clinics and hospitals, schools and various charities.73
Is Hamas a dual-purpose organization? Israel, the United States,
Canada74 and the European Union75 do not recognize the internal
division of Hamas, and consider the organization as a whole to be a
single terrorist entity.76 Australia, on the other hand, designated only the
military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, as a terrorist
organization.77 If we follow the Al-Bihani case, then Hamas should first
69. JIM ZANOTTI, HAMAS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41514 (2010).
70. Listing of Terrorism Organisations, AUSTL. NAT’L SECURITY 1 (Aug. 17, 2012),
available
at
http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/agd/WWW/nationalsecurity.nsf/Page/What_Governments_ar
e_doing_Listing_of_Terrorism_Organisations_Hamas&apos.
71. See Zanotti, supra note 69, at 49. On January 25, 2006 for the first time the Palestinian
Authority held elections for its leadership and parliament. Hamas won the vast majority of the
votes, and got seventy-five seats in the parliament, while its major opponent and the acting party,
the Fatah, received only forty-three seats. Poles held after the elections revealed that the central
reason among voters for supporting Hamas was their disappointment and distrust of the Fatah
regime, and not so much their concurrence with Hamas’s political and ideological platform.
Hamas and Fatah established a combined government. This cooperation notwithstanding, the
rivalry between Hamas and Fatah grew stronger and violent clashes became more frequent, until
June 2007, when Hamas too over the Gaza strip and effectively pushing out Fatah influence. On
June 14, 2006, the leader of the Palestinian Authority, Fatah leader Mahmud Abas, announced the
cancellation of the unified government and outlawed Hamas. Hamas effectively is the governing
power over the Gaza Strip, while Fatah remains the legitimate representation of the Palestinian
Authority and seats in Judea and Samaria. For further reading on Hamas, see SHLOMI ELDAR,
KNOWING THE HAMAS (2012).
72. Zanotti, supra note 69, at 3.
73. Id. at 23.
74. See Currently Listed Entities, PUB. SAFETY CAN. (Dec. 20, 2012), available at
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/le/cle-eng.aspx.
75. 2012 O.J. (L 165) 72 (updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles
2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat
terrorism and repealing Decision 2011/872/CFSP, lists as a terrorist organization “Hamas,”
including “Hamas-Izz al-Din al-Qassem”).
76. Currently Listed Entities, supra note 74.
77. According to the website of the Australian Government, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam
Brigades were reaffirmed as a terrorist organization as late as August 2012. See Listing of
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be identified as either closer to an independent organization or to an
independent state. At this point, there are no voices claiming that the
Gaza strip is a sovereign nation led by Hamas,78 although nobody
contests that Hamas is responsible for operating the vast majority of
every-day services in Gaza; thus it is somewhere in the middle of that
spectrum.
A particularly interesting example of the social activity of Hamas
and of the challenges posed by dual-purpose organizations is the Islamic
University in Gaza.79 Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the founder of Hamas,
established the University in 1978.80 It is the leading academic
institution in Gaza and has over 20,000 students.81 It offers bachelor and
master’s degrees in various fields, including inter alia electronic
engineering, education, physics, literature, history and economy.82 The
University also engages in academic activity and cooperation with
leading institutions worldwide, such as with the London School of
Economics.83
In a research paper published by the Meir Amit Intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center,84 the Islamic University is presented as
an academic institution with high reputation, but is also controlled by
Hamas, and has been used, since its establishment, as a center for
political, social, cultural and military activity of Hamas.85 Many of
Hamas’ leaders have either graduated from the Islamic University or
were members of its faculty.86 It has been claimed by Israel that Izz adDin al-Qassam Brigades use the University’s facilities, such as
chemistry labs, to develop and manufacture weapons and ammunition,
Terrorism Organisations, supra note 70.
78. It is worth mentioning that in this context the attempts by the Palestinian Authority to
get recognition as an independent state from the United Nation, either by admission to U.N.
agencies and organizations such as UNESCO or by applying for a status of a member state in the
U.N. as seen in its formal request to the Security Council in September 2011, and the more
successful application of a non-member state status at the General Assembly in November 2012.
In any matter, if and when such application will meet the approval of the U.N., the Palestinian
state will include the Gaza strip. For further reading on this subject, see Ron Prosor, What Kind of
Palestinian State?, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov. 28, 2012), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323751104578146773248664676.html.
UNIVERSITY
GAZA,
79. See
ISLAMIC
http://www.iugaza.edu.ps/en/About/IntrducingIug.aspx.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Information Center for Intelligence and Terrorism, Islamic University in Gaza:
Academic Institution Dominated by Hamas, Assisted by External Factors, Including Western
Countries
(Apr.
28,
2010),
available
at
http://www.terrorisminfo.org.il/data/pdf/PDF_10_090_1.pdf (Heb.).
85. Thanassis Cambanis, Hamas U, BOSTON.COM (Feb. 28, 2010), available at
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/02/28/hamas_u/.
86. Id.
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and that the University is also a major recruiting hub for Hamas.87 It
should also be mentioned that the University was targeted by the Israel
Defense Force during operation Cast Lead on December 2008.88
A hypothetical yet realistic scenario deals with a United Statesbased foundation set out to help encourage young Palestinians in Gaza
to pursue higher education, with the thought that it will enable them to
find better jobs, expose them to different ideas and pose an alternative
to becoming active supporters of the military fraction of Hamas. To
further that end, the foundation donates a generous sum of money to
build a new library of humanities in the Islamist University.89 Would
such a project constitute an offense of financing terrorism under United
States or Israeli law? The following part answers “yes” to both cases.
IV. ANALYSIS
Legal analysis is much like mathematics—we take a certain set of
facts, put them in a formula and calculate the result. Sometimes it is
easy and other times the numbers just do not add up. Sometimes the
result comes with almost no effort, which makes you think that either
you did something wrong, or there is a problem with the formula. The
hypothetical scenario described above belongs to the latter category,
and as will be illustrated below, the current law and formula are far
from satisfactory. Both United States and Israeli law will regard
donating a new humanities library to the Islamic University as a
criminal offense of financing terrorism.
As explained in Part 2.A. above, the scenario must meet three
requirements in order for it to be a criminal offense under § 2339B.
First, the provision of funds must be considered “material support.” The
definition in § 2339A(b)(1) clearly answers this question in the
affirmative, when it includes in its definition “currency or monetary
instruments.” Second, the funds must be directed to a designated FTO.
This is clear since Hamas is almost an honorary member of the
Department of State’s FTO list. And third, the generous donors must
know Hamas is a designated FTO. Irrespective of the level of awareness
of the average American donor, a person desiring to help the population
87. Id.
88. Israel Strikes Key Hamas Offices, BBC NEWS (Dec. 29, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co/uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/7802515.stm.
89. To illustrate that such a scenario is not farfetched, it is interesting to read Donohue’s
criticism about the United State’s campaign against Muslim charities, in which the following
example is brought, “Al-Sanabil Association for Relief and Development, established in 1993 in
response to UNRWA budget cuts, sponsored 1,200 Palestinian families, spending approximately
$800,000 in 2003 on orphans and $55,000 on needy patients. The organization also distributed
food and home appliances to displaced persons. Treasury [of the United States] froze the group’s
assets in August 2003, claiming that its funds went through Hamas. Those previously benefiting
from the organization witnessed the devastating affect . . . .” See Donohue, supra note 5, at 423.
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in Gaza likely has at least vague understanding of what Hamas are
engaged in, even if they do not have a full account of its terrorist record.
Since this mens rea requirement is very low, this criterion will probably
be met in such circumstances.
A similar result was reached in the United States regarding the
alleged funding of housing units for Al-Eman University in Sanaa,
Yemen.90 There, a Saudi citizen was designated a SDGT by OFAC on
account of his financing support to terrorist organizations, inter alia,
through allocating funds to the University’s aforementioned housing
project.91 In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted that “even allowing
for good-intentioned financial support to organizations and individuals
involved in terrorism would be problematic, as organizations could free
up other resources to be used towards violent terrorist objectives.”92
As to Israeli law, the Law clearly covers the directing of funds as a
primary prohibited conduct. The more difficult task is proving that the
transfer of funds was done with the intent to further a terrorist act, to
reward it, or to finance the actions of a terrorist organization. Since
Hamas is the founder and owner of the University, a case could be made
for at least two of these purposes. While it is unlikely to establish that
such a contribution was made to reward a terrorist act, it may very well
be established that the donation was made for the purpose of furthering
a terrorist act or to finance the activities of Hamas, a terrorist
organization by definition of the Law.
Any lack of clarity in Article 8(a) that may cast doubt on its
relevance to the scenario at hand is made up for in the definitions clause
that follows it. As mentioned above,93 when Article 8(a) states “for the
purpose” of any of those three results, it actually means foreseeing that
at least one of those possibilities is a near certain possibility.94 Hence,
the generous donors need not intend for their money to assist in the
commission of a terrorist act or to help balance the financial sheets of
Hamas. They simply need to recognize that there is a good chance that
it will happen. Hamas’ notorious reputation, for example, for using
civilian population contrary to the laws of war, holding an IDF soldier
in captivity contrary to the third Geneva Conventions and engaging in
other acts of terror, makes any other assumption a ridiculous one.
After applying two anti-terrorism statutes to a hypothetical case,
the result is that what may have been a genuinely good deed “goes
punished.” This in turn will deter future well-intentioned donors and
will pose serious questions about the purpose of it all—are those laws
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Kadi v. Timothy Geithner, supra note 68.
Id.
Id. at 54.
See Part 2.B. above.
Prohibition on Terrorist Financing Law, 5765-2003, supra note 28, § 8(b)(2).
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really suppressing terrorism? Or are they just enabling terrorist
organizations to have their way with large numbers of civilians simply
because nobody else will set an alternative?
Having Hamas as the controlling entity leaves no option for outside
funding because of the prohibitions against financial support, and
thereby forces the local population to rely on Hamas for providing basic
services—and Hamas is willing to do so. The proposed funding might
be misused and not allocated to building the library, or it will be used
for that purpose but, as a result, will enhance Hamas’ popularity within
the local community and free up funds for terrorist use. Neither option
is desired. The following conclusion will discuss the complex policy
considerations involved in anti-terrorist financing laws.
V. CONCLUSIONS
As shown in the previous part, the applicability of anti-terrorism
financing laws to dual-purpose organizations may bring about absurd
results. This part will conclude the discussion, presenting both sides of
the scale. This part argues that while this absurdity should not be
overlooked, regarding the final balance between continuing to apply the
statutes as they are and amending them so as to address such special
cases, the stakes for abusing the latter option are grave enough to render
the status quos the best course of action, at least for the time being.
In addition to the realistic fear of a misuse of contributions,
another argument in favor of criminalizing support of the non-military
wing of dual-purpose organizations is that such organizations hold even
greater leverage over the population and thus possess various means to
coerce a population to participate in its terrorist activity.95 For instance,
a resident of Gaza will have a much harder time refusing support to
Hamas if the sanctions that he might suffer on account of his refusal
include potential cut power lines to his home and loss of education
rights to his children.
Some scholars criticize this line of thought. Professor Crimm, for
example, aptly argues that anti-terrorism financing legislation may bring
about the exact opposite result than intended, because legislation
unintentionally forces the public further into the arms of terrorist
organizations by banning legitimate sources of funding.96 Thus, as long
as we refuse to acknowledge the welfare projects run by these
95. Levanon, supra note 54, at 266.
96. Crimm, supra note 6, at 1450, where she challenges the core rationale of the antiterrorism financing legislation, stating that “a wholesale blight on the provision of financial
support for humanitarian aid, the promotion of health, the enhancement of education and other
charitable causes, the facilitation of economic development, the building of social capital, and the
strengthening of social stability could fuel the destabilization of struggling people abroad and
enhance the appeal of terrorist groups to these people.”
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organizations and peg them as subject to outside influence, we leave the
general population with no other choice but to turn to the terrorist
organization to control their life. By this logic, prudent support directed
to certain social projects may actually assist in diverting public opinion
away from their former terrorist patron.97
These arguments come down to the following equilibrium. On one
end of the scale is the desire to promote welfare and quality of life to
populations controlled by terrorist organizations. A person that is
securely employed, educated, able to feed his family, and who promises
his children a solid future, is likely less eager to participate in terrorist
activity. On the other end is the grim reality that at the end of the day,
these dual-purpose organizations simply did not earn the right to enjoy
the benefit of the doubt. The abuse of well-intended funds and projects
speak for itself. It makes little difference that the money is intended to
fund a valuable desired project if, de facto, it funds more violence and
terrorism. The original intention of the donation does not make the
result any less destructive.98
In sum, building a new library of the humanities at the Islamist
University would probably go a long way. But there is a chance, and
unfortunately not a small one, that some of the money donated to this
project will end up funding terrorist acts. The critics should not be
underestimated. More thorough research is needed to determine the
legal, legitimate ways around the pockets of the terrorist organizations,
because the fight against terrorism is not just in the battlefield and in the
courtrooms. It is also in places such as the Library of the Humanities at
a University in Gaza.

97. Pendle, supra note 9, at 87, making a similar distinction to the one made by Crimm, and
even further, encouraging American donations that “may help ameliorate intolerable conditions in
the most desperate corners of the world and could consequently be an invaluable tool in the War
on Terrorism”. See generally Levanon, supra note 53, at 229.
98. Barkin, supra note 8, at 193.

